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Abstract: 
This paper examines the impacts of R&D tax credits and direct R&D subsidies on Norwegian firms' 
patenting, with a particular focus on environmental patenting. Whereas direct subsidies are aimed at 
projects with low private and high social return, tax credits do not discriminate between projects or 
technologies. We find that both direct subsidies and tax credits have significant positive effects on 
patenting in general. Although direct subsidies have triggered more patents, tax credits are more 
efficient in the sense that they have triggered more patents relative to the typical subsidy amount 
received. With regard to environmental patenting, we find no significant effects of tax credits, 
whereas the effects of direct subsidies are large and significant. A possible explanation is that 
environmental innovations face the environmental externality, greater knowledge externalities and 
require funding that is willing to take more risks and allow more patience. Tax credits currently favor 
small and medium sized firms and firms with relatively low R&D investments. For large firms, we find 
large and significant effects of direct subsidies, but no significant effects of tax credits. 
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Sammendrag 
Både direkte subsidier og skattefradrag gir flere patenter hos norske foretak. Når det gjelder 
miljørelatert teknologi, gir direkte subsidier størst effekt.  
 
I studien «The effects of innovation policies on firm level patenting» ser forskeren Marit E. Klemetsen 
nærmere på effektene av FoU-politiske virkemidler på patentering i norske foretak, med et særlig 
fokus på miljørelatert teknologi.  
 
Skattefradrag mest effektivt 
Studien viser at både direkte subsidier og skattefradrag har signifikante, positive effekter på 
patentering generelt. Direkte subsidier har trigget flere patenter, men skattefradragene er mer effektive 
i den forstand at de har trigget flere patenter i forhold til de typiske subsidiebeløpene som foretakene 
mottar.  
 
Miljøteknologi avhengig av langsiktig og risikovillig finansiering 
Hva gjelder miljøpatenter viser studien ingen effekter av skattefradrag, mens effekten av direkte 
subsidier derimot er sterk og signifikant. En mulig forklaring er at miljøteknologi står overfor 
miljøeksternaliteter, genererer større kunnskapseksternaliteter, og i større grad er avhengig av 
langsiktig og risikovillig finansiering. For å stimulere denne typen teknologiutvikling bør subsidier 
fortsatt rettes mot prioriterte teknologiområder. Skattefradrag stimulerer i større grad til utvikling av 
teknologi som allerede ligger nære opp til de eksisterende markedsløsningene, og i mindre grad til de 
store teknologisprangene. Samfunnsgevinsten vil sannsynligvis øke dersom skattefradragene utformes 
slik at subsidiene reflekterer kunnskapseksternalitetene knyttet til prosjektet. 
 
Subsidieres i tråd med potensiell verdi for samfunnet 
Direkte subsidier fra Norges Forskningsråd og Innovasjon Norge er rettet mot prosjekter hvor den 
private gevinsten er lavere enn den potensielle verdien prosjektet har for samfunnet. Det vil si at 
direkte subsidier søker å subsidiere i tråd med størrelsen på kunnskapseksternalitetene knyttet til 
prosjektet.  På den annen side, er skattefradrag fra SkatteFUNN-ordningen en rettighetsbasert ordning 
som er teknologinøytral i den forstand at foretaket selv kan bestemme hvilken type teknologi som skal 
utvikles.  
 
Ingen effekter av skattefradrag hos store foretak 
SkatteFUNN-ordningen favoriserer per i dag små og mellomstore foretak, fordi man antar at disse har 
lavere tilgang til privat finansiering. Hos store foretak identifiserer denne studien sterke og 
signifikante effekter av direkte subsidier, men ingen effekter av skattefradrag. Heller enn økte 
skattefradrag eller tilskudd til små og mellomstore foretak, bør man støtte foretak med lav tilgang til 
privat kapital gjennom låneordninger. 
 
1 Introduction
A strict reliance on a market system will result in underinvestment in innovation, relative
to the socially desirable level (Griliches, 2000; Martin and Scott, 2000). Market failures
arise because of e.g. limited appropriability, ﬁnancial constraints and external knowledge
spillovers. For this reason, many countries undertake policies aiming to increase the R&D
activity. The contribution of this paper is to examine the eﬀects of public innovation policies
in Norway on ﬁrms' propensity to patent. The policies that we consider are the R&D tax
credit scheme (called SkatteFUNN ) and direct R&D subsidies from the Research Council
of Norway and Innovation Norway1. Moreover, we aim to provide insight into whether
policy makers ought to stimulate environmental innovation speciﬁcally, in order to achieve
a less distorted competition between environmental and non-environmental innovation, and
whether the tax credit scheme ought to continue oﬀering a higher percentage tax credit to
small and medium sized ﬁrms (SMEs) than large ﬁrms.
A number of studies advocate that environmental innovations diﬀer from other innova-
tions. Environmental innovation stands out with respect to drivers and the importance of
regulation (Horbach, 2008; Porter and Van der Linde, 1995). Several studies ﬁnd that the
development of environmental technologies are subject to a double externality problem. In
addition to the knowledge externality, environmental innovation faces the environmental
externality exerted by dirty input producers (Acemoglu et al., 2012; Dechezleprêtre et al.,
2015; Jaﬀe et al., 2005; Rennings, 2000). The double externality problem reduces the in-
centives for ﬁrms to invest in environmental innovations. As long as markets do not punish
environmental harmful impacts suﬃciently, competition between environmental and non-
environmental innovation is distorted (Rennings, 2000). Moreover, Dechezleprêtre et al.
(2013) ﬁnd that environmental technology patents have more citations. The authors argue
that this is evidence of greater knowledge externalities, which motivates additional public
R&D subsidies directed towards the development of environmental technologies. According
1A government body for promoting industry development.
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to Mazzucato (2013), environmental innovation is an example of an innovation sector that
relies on funding that is more willing to take risks and to invest in projects with longer
time-horizons and lower expected returns. Despite the rich literature on diﬀerences between
environmental and non-environmental innovation, we are not aware of any empirical stud-
ies that compare the eﬀect of diﬀerent innovation policies on general versus environmental
innovation. Our empirical analysis seeks to ﬁll this gap.
The interest by policy-makers in innovation arises from the premise that public policy is
able to inﬂuence both the rate and the direction of innovation (Ha²£i£ and Migotto, 2015).
Innovation policies to support private R&D activities should reﬂect the size of the external
spillovers from the research (Goulder and Schneider, 1999; Straathof et al., 2014). Even if
such external spillovers are found to diﬀer between innovation sectors, the Norwegian R&D
tax credit scheme oﬀers the same subsidies for any type of technology or sector. Hence, tax
credits do not aim speciﬁcally to ﬁnance according to the size of the external spillovers from
the research. Instead, the tax credits favor small and medium-sized ﬁrms (SMEs) and ﬁrms
with relatively low R&D costs (see Section 2.2). On the other hand, both the Research
Council and Innovation Norway oﬀer direct R&D subsidies intended for projects with low
private and high social return. Hence, they aim to reﬂect the size of the external spillovers
of the research project through speciﬁc programs.
There is a substantial amount of literature on the eﬀects of public R&D subsidies on
private R&D. A central debate is on whether public R&D funding crowds out private R&D,
or if public R&D subsidies induce additional private R&D. Moreover, ﬁrms can beneﬁt
from other ﬁrms' previous accumulations of knowledge.2 For a review, see e.g. David et al.
(2000) or Hall et al. (2010). Almus and Czarnitzki (2003) use a matching strategy on ﬁrms
in Eastern Germany and ﬁnd that ﬁrms that received public R&D funding achieve a higher
R&D intensity on average than ﬁrms in the control group. Bøler et al. (2014) ﬁnd that the
Norwegian tax credits have positive eﬀects on R&D and imported inputs of intermediates,
2Often referred to as the standing on shoulders-eﬀect. The beneﬁts of such spillovers are not taken into account
in ﬁrms' decisions with regard to R&D investments (Romer, 1990).
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whereas Hægeland and Møen (2007a) identify positive eﬀects of tax credits on R&D.
Increased R&D expenditures is not necessarily equivalent to increased productivity and
human capital development. For instance, nominal R&D might increase because ﬁrms adapt
to the policies by reclassifying spending that they otherwise would not have characterized
as R&D. Policies with low administration costs and limited control routines, such as the
tax credit scheme, could be particularly vulnerable to such adaptations. Other studies
investigate the eﬀect of R&D subsidies on innovation. Bérubé and Mohnen (2009) ﬁnd
that ﬁrms which receive direct R&D subsidies in addition to R&D tax credits are more
innovative than ﬁrms which only receive tax credits. Cappelen et al. (2012) ﬁnd that tax
credits contribute to an increase in the rate of ﬁrms' innovation, but not to an increase in
patenting. Horbach (2008) identiﬁes eﬀects of ﬁnancial investment subsidies on innovation.
However, none of the mentioned analyses use patent registry data  instead they use survey
data with self-reported measures of innovation and patenting. Johnstone et al. (2010)
identify eﬀects of environmental policies on renewable energy patents. However, as this
study is at the country level, several heterogeneity issues are likely to be present. Moreover,
none of the studies mentioned above compare the eﬀects of innovation policies on innovation
in general and environmental innovation in particular.
In this study we use Norwegian ﬁrm level registry data on patents which recently have
been assigned with ﬁrm identiﬁcation numbers, allowing us to merge data on patents with
various other data sets, such as innovation policy databases, accounting statistics and data
on environmental regulations and education levels of employees. In most countries, there
is no unique identiﬁer allowing researchers to link intellectual property information directly
to other ﬁrm-level data (Helmers et al., 2011).3
We contribute to the existing literature in three ways. First, we investigate potential
diﬀerences between the response of an R&D tax credit scheme and direct R&D subsidies
3Instead, the names indicated on patent documents, including assignee and inventor names, and the ﬁrm names
contained in ﬁrm-level databases are used to merge data sets. Matching ﬁrm names across data sets is challenging
and prone to errors (Helmers et al., 2011; Tarasconi and Kang, 2015).
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on innovation in general and environmental innovation in particular. Second, we include
the entire population of Norwegian incorporated ﬁrms in our study. Previous studies are
typically based on innovation surveys. For Norway, this limits the sample to large ﬁrms
and a sub-sample of SMEs. Hence, we are able to identify eﬀects of various innovation
policies on SMEs as well. Third, according to both theoretical and empirical approaches
to the economics of innovation (see Cohen, 2010, for a literature overview), other speciﬁc
characteristics of ﬁrms are also likely to inﬂuence innovation. Our rich data set allows us
to control for observed ﬁrm heterogeneity through a wealth of control variables. In the
study on environmental patenting we also control for supply-side (both direct and indirect)
regulations that the ﬁrms may face using ﬁrm speciﬁc data on non-tradable and tradable
quotas as well as relative energy prices (dirty over clean).
We ﬁnd that both R&D tax credits and direct R&D subsidies have signiﬁcant eﬀects on
patenting. Relative to the subsidies received, tax credits are more eﬃcient in generating
patents compared to direct subsidies. However, as the estimates do not capture patent
value or commercialization, we cannot exclude that direct subsidies typically trigger more
important or valuable innovations. Direct subsidies are aimed at projects with low private
and high social return. When policy makers target priority technology areas, they are aware
that such projects typically involve a higher risk of a lower return, even if the project has
a high potential value. With regard to environmental innovation, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant
eﬀects of tax credits. On the other hand, direct subsidies have large and signiﬁcant eﬀects
on environmental patenting. Our empirical results conﬁrm the notion that the conditions for
environmental innovation stand out from innovation in general. The tax credit scheme does
not take into account that environmental innovation is exposed to greater market failures
such as path dependencies towards dirty technologies, public good issues, larger knowledge
externalities, etc. Technology-neutral tax credits thus enhance the distorted competition
between environmental and non-environmental innovation. For large ﬁrms, we ﬁnd large
and signiﬁcant eﬀects of direct subsidies, but no signiﬁcant eﬀects of tax credits. Vital but
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long-term or risky R&D projects would be facilitated if, rather than favoring SMEs and
ﬁrms with relatively low R&D costs, tax credits were designed to reﬂect the size of the
external spillovers from the research generated by the project.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 contains a description of the data
and the variables used in the empirical analysis. The econometric model and the results are
presented in Section 3. Finally, Section 4 concludes and suggests some policy implications.
2 Data sources and description of variables
Drawing on several sources, we have prepared a ﬁrm-level panel data set covering the en-
tire population of Norwegian incorporated ﬁrms. The data span 19 years, from 1993 to
2011. To measure innovation, we use patent data from the Norwegian Patent Oﬃce.4 The
latter data source enables the identiﬁcation of type of technology (environmental or non-
environmental). The Norwegian patent data contains ﬁrm identiﬁcation numbers allowing
us to match patents to data sets on regulations and control variables from several other
sources. The ﬁrm identiﬁcation numbers allow for a more reliable match of the patent data
to the other data sets. PATSTAT and the US patent oﬃce also oﬀer ﬁrm identiﬁcations, but
only as ﬁrm names. Even if the patent oﬃces have harmonized the name use within their
organizations, name harmonization with other data sources is challenging. The Norwegian
ﬁrm identiﬁcation numbers are unique for each ﬁrm and is used as a common identiﬁer for
all data sources.
Data on innovation policies are gathered from three diﬀerent sources: Innovation Nor-
way's (and predecessor's) databases, the PROVIS database from the Research Council of
Norway and the SkatteFUNN database. Another advantage of using these data sources is
that information related to R&D subsidies are in fact available for the entire population of
4Thanks to Pål Knudsen at Statistics Norway for supplementing the oﬃcial data from the Norwegian Patent Oﬃce
with complete IPC-codes from electronically available patent documents, as the oﬃcial data set only includes the
ﬁrst IPC-code in the application.
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ﬁrms that have received support.5 Hence, we rely only on registry (not survey) data. Several
studies on the eﬀects of innovation policies rely on R&D surveys. However, comparing the
data from the SkatteFUNN database and the Norwegian R&D survey data shows that the
timing of the R&D support, and also often the reported sums received, diﬀer greatly. There
are also large discrepancies between the survey-reported patenting and the actual registered
patents and patent application data from the Norwegian Patent Oﬃce.
The data mentioned above are supplemented with annual data from three diﬀerent regis-
ters at Statistics Norway: The accounts statistics, the register of employers and employees,
and the national education database. These data sources allow us to construct several con-
trol variables at the ﬁrm level. In order to control for supply-side policies, which are likely to
matter for environmental innovation, we include ﬁrm level data on electricity-, petroleum-
and gas prices, and tradable carbon emission quotas from the Energy and Environmental
Accounts and the National Accounts at Statistics Norway. Finally, we have data from the
Norwegian Environmental Agency (NEA) on direct regulations of all land based Norwegian
ﬁrms that have emission permits from the NEA. A detailed description of the key variables
is provided below, where they are grouped into three main categories: measures of innova-
tion (Section 2.1), measures of innovation policies (Section 2.2), and other determinants of
innovation (control variables  Section 2.3).
2.1 Innovation measures
We use patent applications and granted patents as measures of innovative activities. When
studying ﬁrms' responses to policies, the input activity can be a more appropriate measure
of the incentive than successful outcomes of the activity. On the other hand, the analysis on
granted patents allows us (at least partly) to take into account the quality of the innovation.
An advantage of using patent data is that patent documents provide information about
the nature of the innovation, so that they can be classiﬁed by technological area. To
5If more than one ﬁrm participates in a project, the data from the PROVIS-database are only available for the
main contractor ﬁrm.
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identify environmental patents, we follow Johnstone et al. (2010), Lanzi et al. (2011), and
Dechezleprêtre et al. (2013), and classify the technology based on the International Patent
Classiﬁcation (IPC) codes developed by the World Intellectual Property Organization.6
Environmental technologies are broadly deﬁned as patents that have direct or indirect eﬀects
on the environment, by e.g. improving energy or fuel eﬃciency, preventing pollution through
source or waste reduction, eliminating pollution after it has occurred (end-of-pipe), etc.
A potential issue in relation to patent data is that we cannot distinguish valuable from
insigniﬁcant patents. Many patents have little value, and so the number of patent applica-
tions (or even granted patents) is primarily a measure of innovative activity or eﬀort, rather
than the value of the innovations. Moreover, patenting is only one means of protecting
innovations. Innovators may prefer secrecy to prevent the public disclosure of an innovation
required by patent law, or to save the signiﬁcant fees associated with ﬁling patents (Deche-
zleprêtre et al., 2011). On the other hand, there are very few examples of economically
signiﬁcant innovations that have not been patented (Dernis and Guellec, 2001; Dernis and
Khan, 2004). Thus, despite their drawbacks, it is reasonable to assume that patents are
strongly correlated with innovations.
We see from Figure 1 that the number of non-environmental patent applications increases
until 2007, but then decreases. This drop in non-environmental patent applications is pos-
sibly due to the ﬁnancial crisis. Strikingly enough, environmental patent applications do
not drop during or after the crisis. The annual numbers of granted patents are increasing
in the ﬁrst years, but towards the end of the period both the number of environmental and
non-environmental granted patents drop. Keeping in mind that the number of environmen-
tal patent applications is increasing in the same period, the drop from 2009 and onwards is
likely, at least partly, due to the processing time at the Patent Oﬃce which is typically two
to three years. Using data on granted patents thus involves timeliness problems (censoring),
and we return to this issue in Section 3.
6http://www.wipo.int/classiﬁcations/ipc/en/est/index.html
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Figure 1: Yearly sum of patent applications and granted patents.
2.2 Innovation policy measures
The Norwegian innovation policy instruments can be grouped into two main categories:
i) tax credits, which are rights-based subsidies, given that some formal requirements are
fulﬁlled by the applicant; and ii) direct subsidies intended for projects with low private
and high social returns. Direct subsidies aim to reﬂect the size of the external spillovers
from the research. The primary diﬀerence between these two innovation policy instruments
is that the former typically allows ﬁrms to choose projects, whereas the latter usually is
accompanied by a government directed project choice (David et al., 2000). As a result,
direct subsidies involve competition between agents. The two types of subsidies are thus
exposed to diﬀerent types of selection biases. A frequently advocated argument against
direct subsidies is that the state should not try to pick winners. Mazzucato (2013) argues
that we need to shift the focus away from the worry that the state is picking winners,
and towards the needs of complex, network dependent, high-risk, and patience-demanding
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innovation sectors. A main diﬀerence between public and private venture capital is that
public venture capital is willing to invest in areas with much higher risk, while allowing
a longer time-horizon and lower expectations of future returns. Examples of innovation
sectors that rely particularly on such conditions are the computer industry, the internet,
the pharmaceutical-biotech industry, nanotech and the emerging green tech sector.
The development of environmental technologies is exposed to a joint market failure (re-
ferred to in the literature as the double externality problem). In addition to the knowledge
externality, environmental innovation suﬀers from the environmental externality exerted
by dirty input producers.7 These combined market failures provide a strong rationale for
a portfolio of public policies that foster emissions reduction (supply-side) as well as the
development and adoption of environmentally beneﬁcial technology (demand-side) (Jaﬀe
et al., 2005). Supply-side environmental regulations, such as e.g. taxes on pollution, can
spur environmental innovation by creating incentives for less polluting technologies. Deche-
zleprêtre et al. (2013) argue that once some mechanism (e.g. taxes on pollution) is in place
to internalize the environmental externality, there is no reason a priori to implement R&D
policies speciﬁcally targeting clean technology development. However, using environmental
(supply-side) regulations both to reduce emissions and to stimulate R&D would lead to
excessive distortions (Acemoglu et al., 2012). Acemoglu et al. (2012) thus argue that an
optimal policy involves immediately directing R&D towards clean technologies. Moreover,
Dechezleprêtre et al. (2013) identify larger knowledge spillovers (measured as patent cita-
tion counts) within clean technologies than within other types of technologies. Hence, the
authors argue that pollution pricing should be complemented with speciﬁc support for clean
innovation, e.g. through additional direct R&D subsidies that go beyond standard policies
in place to internalize knowledge externalities. De Marchi (2012) ﬁnds that environmental
innovation relies more on cooperation with larger networks of external partners.
Traditionally, Norwegian R&D subsidies have mainly been given as direct subsidies to
7Acemoglu et al. (2012) ﬁnd that environmental innovation suﬀers from market size eﬀects (path dependence)
and price eﬀects (a productivity advantage of dirty inputs).
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ﬁrms (Hægeland and Møen, 2007b). The Research Council and Innovation Norway pro-
vide diﬀerent types of direct subsidies.8 The Research Council oﬀers strategic and targeted
subsidies for research where at least 50 percent of the project is expected to be ﬁnanced
by the ﬁrm itself.9 They also have larger programs designed to build long-term knowledge
to encourage innovation, enhance value creation, as well as help ﬁnd solutions to impor-
tant challenges facing society. Innovation Norway oﬀers direct subsidies in the form of
direct grants, high-risk loans and guaranties. Both the Research Council10 and Innova-
tion Norway11 oﬀer direct subsidies for priority thematic and technology areas, such as e.g.
environmental technologies.
Tax incentives have become an increasingly popular policy tool over the last decades,
and in several countries it is a supplement to direct R&D subsidies.12 In Norway, a R&D
tax credit scheme (SkatteFUNN ) was proposed and passed as a part of the Norwegian tax
system by the parliament in December 2001. The program was introduced in January 2002
to SMEs13 but extended to all ﬁrms in the following year. It was believed that an R&D tax
credit scheme would provide more stable conditions for the business community than direct
grants (Cappelen et al., 2010). Firms are entitled to tax credits as long as the R&D project
has been approved by the Research Council. Firms can deduct from their taxes a certain
amount of their R&D expenditures. Currently, tax credits favor SMEs and  because of a
maximum tax relief limit  ﬁrms with relatively low R&D investments.14 The limit makes
8The Research Council and Innovation Norway not only provide support intended to enhance innovation. The
policy assignments from the government to Innovation Norway can be speciﬁed in three separate categories: In
addition to innovation, they support regional development and oﬀer ﬁnancial lending intended to improve survival
probabilities. We exclude support intended for the two latter objectives from our data in order to identify the eﬀects
from subsidies aimed at innovation. In addition to innovation subsidies, the Research Council provides support for
e.g. project establishments and knowledge-building projects not directly related to innovation, which we exclude from
our data.
9Direct subsidies from Innovation Norway typically covers a larger percentage of the project cost. See the home
page of Innovation Norway (in Norwegian) for more details.
10http://www.forskningsradet.no/en/Research_areas/1252498540762
11http://www.innovasjonnorge.no/no/ﬁnansiering/miljoteknologi/
12R&D tax incentive schemes are widely adopted in advanced economies including the United States, Japan, and
all EU countries except Germany and Estonia (Straathof et al., 2014).
13Firms with a) less than 250 employees, and b) a yearly sales income not exceeding 50 million Euros or a yearly
proﬁt not exceeding 43 million Euros ( 16-40-5 Regulations for Law of Taxation)
14From 2003 the SkatteFUNN scheme granted large ﬁrms 18 percent of R&D expenses related to an approved
project up to a limit of 4 million NOK (approximately 0.5 million euros). From 2009 and onwards the maximum limit
increased to 5.5 million NOK. Hence, the maximum tax relief for a large ﬁrm (until 2014 when the limit increased
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Table 1: Patent and innovation subsidy statistics and ﬁrm sizes1, 2002-2011
Sum2 tax credits Sum2 dir. subs. (RCN and IN) Patent applications
Year Small Medium Large Small Medium Large Small Medium Large
2002 634,793 44,908 519 423,063 184,144 131,719 389 87 193
2003 1,011,367 181,201 50,441 388,790 167,213 138,310 356 106 174
2004 1,108,595 201,914 56,154 376,750 155,426 126,858 415 87 185
2005 872,582 168,711 53,914 404,525 173,325 127,191 404 107 179
2006 860,095 164,653 50,395 589,808 209,654 203,542 385 99 210
2007 811,023 135,141 42,230 686,028 213,676 208,123 406 95 269
2008 830,868 130,598 43,293 847,496 232,874 201,247 451 90 191
2009 965,339 167,356 44,990 2,198,721 441,983 333,572 477 102 157
2010 986,536 178,587 57,233 1,615,357 347,524 200,851 408 80 173
2011 1,059,070 182,810 58,165 1,526,396 342,462 274,767 457 89 134
1Small ﬁrms: <50 employees, medium ﬁrms: [50, 250) employees, large ﬁrms: ≥ 250 employees
2The ﬁgures are in 1000 NOK
the program relatively less appealing to ﬁrms that currently have much resources invested
in R&D (as ﬁrms are not subsidized on the margin for expenses exceeding the limit). A
rationale for favoring SMEs is that these may face greater ﬁnancial constraints. Although
low access to loans or private venture capital can hinder innovation, it is in practice diﬃcult
to identify ﬁrms that truly are exposed to such constraints, and the best solution is thus
not necessarily higher percentages tax credits or grants. Another rationale behind favoring
SMEs is the notion that innovation and economic growth is created by entrepreneurial
small ﬁrms. However, there is little empirical evidence to support this notion. As Mazzucato
(2013) points out, the relationship between ﬁrm size and innovation is sensitive to various
factors such as industry or technology speciﬁc eﬀects. Moreover, many of the small ﬁrms
tend to be young. Based on the current design, the purpose of tax credits is not to reﬂect
the size of the external spillovers from the research. Unlike direct subsidies, the Norwegian
tax credit scheme does not discriminate between types of projects or technologies. However,
even if tax credits may make marginal projects proﬁtable, ﬁrms will still focus on projects
again) was 5.5*0.18=0.99 million NOK (113 000 euros, based on the mean exchange rate 1 NOK≈8.73 EURO per
2009). For SMEs the rate is 20 percent. The tax refund takes place the year after the actual R&D expenses have
occurred. If the ﬁrm does not pay enough taxes, they get the remaining tax credit as a direct grant. See Cappelen
et al., 2010 for more details.
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Table 2: Incorporated ﬁrms receiving innovation subsidies, 2002-2011
Tax credits (SkatteFUNN) Direct subsidies (RCN) Direct subsidies (IN)
Year Sum1 Firms Median1 Sum1 Firms Median1 Sum1 Firms Median1
2002 689,341 1749 315 555,635 375 533 190,001 284 400
2003 1,253,382 3176 314 535,383 381 500 163,879 282 348
2004 1,375,581 3481 318 503,798 311 690 158,871 291 300
2005 1,099,471 2690 330 557,220 344 750 153,467 248 250
2006 1,077,706 2512 356 776,391 423 907 238,650 329 250
2007 988,549 2369 343 793,604 441 1000 314,931 337 300
2008 1,004,758 2241 373 837,773 590 636 444,337 404 373
2009 1,177,685 2242 420 1,045,084 442 1052 1,929,191 760 700
2010 1,222,357 2328 410 1,340,699 397 1511 823,033 551 440
2011 1,300,046 2347 437 1,503,256 315 3051 640,368 480 435
1The ﬁgures are in 1000 NOK
with the greatest short-term returns. Tax credits may not be the best policy tool to promote
new technologies that are not close to the market (Dechezleprêtre et al., 2015; David et al.,
2000). Moreover, it is unlikely that tax credits contribute in reducing the market failures
and challenges that face the development of environmental technologies in particular.
Table 1 provides some statistics of the total sum of R&D subsidies received and patent
applications for small and large ﬁrms. During the years 2002-2011, 282,891 ﬁrms can be
categorized as small, 5,525 ﬁrms as medium sized and 1,030 ﬁrms as large. Even if large
ﬁrms receive only 4 percent of the tax credits and 16 percent of the direct subsidies, they
hold 24 percent of the patent applications. Medium sized ﬁrms receive 14 percent of the tax
credits, 20 percent of the direct subsidies, and hold 12 percent of the patent applications.
Finally, small ﬁrms receive 82 percent of the tax credits, 63 percent of the direct subsidies,
and hold 53 percent of the patent applications. It seems that the larger the ﬁrm, the more
innovative it is, relative to the funding. A possible explanation is that large ﬁrms respond
more eﬃciently to the policies (i.e., that the policy maker gets a higher return for subsidizing
large ﬁrms). Another possibility is that larger ﬁrms are more innovative regardless of the
policies. We investigate this further at the ﬁrm level below (see Tables 10-11 and the
discussion in Section 4).
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Table 3: Patent statistics based on innovation subsidy received, 2002-2011
Subsidy received Firms Applications Granted Applications (envir.) Granted (envir.)
Only tax credits 5,871 1,752 796 765 359
Only direct subsidies1 1,580 462 191 239 108
Both subsidies2 1,993 3,499 1,546 1,752 841
Neither subsidy 287,734 1,270 433 612 227
1Either from the Research Council or Innovation Norway
2Tax credits and direct subsidies from either the Research Council or Innovation Norway
Table 2 illustrates some statistics for ﬁrms that receive subsidies in the time period 2002-
2011. During the years 2003-2006 the total sum of tax credits from SkatteFUNN exceeds the
total sum of direct subsidies from the Research Council and Innovation Norway combined.
The opposite is true for the years 2002 and 2007-2011.15 The median amount of tax credits
received is somewhat lower than the median amount of direct subsidies, but a larger number
of ﬁrms receive tax credits than direct subsidies. Table 3 displays patent statistics for ﬁrms
based on whether or not they receive subsidies from some given source in the time period
2002-2011. Firms that receive both direct subsidies and tax credits have a much higher
propensity for patenting than ﬁrms which only receive subsidies from one source.16
In our empirical analysis, we use dummy variables to measure the eﬀect of the two types
of R&D subsidies. The fact that direct subsidies are typically larger than tax credits at
the ﬁrm level is thus not taken into account. A ﬁrm receiving a large amount of support
can have a higher propensity for patenting, cet. par. However, taking this into account by
including weights for amounts received, would imply that we actually measure the eﬀect of
R&D investments, as the subsidies received typically constitute some percentage of the ﬁrm's
R&D. An alternative is to control for R&D expenditures. However this would signiﬁcantly
reduce the sample size as R&D data are only available for a sub-sample of Norwegian ﬁrms.
Moreover, this would eliminate some of the eﬀects that we are interested in estimating, as
15The huge increase in direct subsidies from Innovation Norway in 2009 was a part of the government eﬀorts to
compensate for the ﬁnancial crisis.
16A large share of the 1,580 ﬁrms that only receive direct subsidies are ﬁrms that receive support only from
Innovation Norway.
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R&D expenditures and patenting are highly correlated. When interpreting the marginal
eﬀects in Section 3, we should relate these estimates directly to the subsidies received.
Bøler et al. (2014) and Hægeland and Møen (2007a) investigate eﬀects of the Norwegian
tax credit scheme. In order to reduce bias the studies use a diﬀerence-in diﬀerences approach
and exploit that, for a given ﬁrm, only R&D investments up until NOK 4 million were eligible
for the tax credits. Firms that already invest more than the cap are not subsidized at the
margin and hence have little or no incentive to increase their R&D. They thus argue that
this provides exogenous variation in the selection of ﬁrms that were given support (the
treatment group) and the ones which were not (the control group). However, data on R&D
are only available in survey data (and for a sub-sample of Norwegian ﬁrms) and what the
ﬁrm would have invested in the absence of the tax credit scheme is not observable. Moreover,
it is questionable whether this method is usable when ﬁrms can receive support over several
years. Finally, ﬁrms have an incentive for tax planning. That is, to inﬂate reported R&D
in years they are given a tax relief (adapt the timing) or by claiming tax credits against
spending that they would not previously have classiﬁed as R&D (OECD, 2007). We thus
do not believe the cap provides an exogenous selection of a treatment and control group. In
any case, we want to study the eﬀects not only of tax credits, but also of direct subsidies
(where there is no such limit on R&D expenditures). Instead, we choose a count data model
with ﬁxed eﬀects. We return to the modeling issue in Section 3.
2.3 Control variables
Contrary to studies at the industry level, our analysis takes into account ﬁrm heterogeneity,
and thereby reduces the problem of omitted variables bias. We use the number of employees
as a measure of ﬁrm size. Proﬁt margin (proﬁts divided by total revenue) is a measure of
the ﬁnancial resources of the ﬁrm. Capital intensity is measured as tangible ﬁxed assets
excluding buildings and land (in ﬁxed prices) relative to the number of employees. The
share of employees with masters' education or more is included as a measure of employee
17
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Figure 2: Firm characteristics (intervals on the horizontal axes) and the probability of at
least one patent application in a ﬁrm-year (y-axes). The sample mean value is 0.6 percent.
skill. Figure 2 shows that several ﬁrm speciﬁc characteristics are important drivers of
innovation and should be included as control variables. A positive relationship between
the propensity for patenting and employee skill is illustrated in panel a. Firm size is also
positively correlated with patenting (panel b). Panel c illustrates that the propensity for
patenting increases moderately with capital intensity.
Figure 3 depicts the share of ﬁrm-years17 in each of the aggregated industries with at
least one patent application,18 and at least one granted patent, as well as the share of ﬁrms
in the industries that at least once in the estimation period receive R&D tax credits, direct
R&D subsidies from the Research Council (RCN) or Innovation Norway (IN). The upper
panel shows large diﬀerences between industries with regard to the propensity for patenting.
An additional explanation can be that some industries tend to rely more on other means
of proﬁting from their innovations than patenting. The three top industries in terms of
propensity for patenting are Mining; Manufacturing of chemicals, pharmaceuticals, rubber
17A ﬁrm-year is the observation of one ﬁrm in one year.
18That is, the number of ﬁrm-years with at least one patent application divided by the total number of ﬁrm-years
in the industry.
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and plastic; and Manufacturing of metals and minerals. Whereas the two latter industries
are among the top three receivers of (all types of) subsidies, Mining is not. Hence, while
the general tendency is that the industries that relatively often receive subsidies also have
a relatively high propensity for patenting, this is not always the case. We include industry
dummies in order to pick up industry ﬁxed eﬀects, such as e.g. diﬀering strategies on how
to protect and appropriate income from their innovation. We deal with common trends by
including year ﬁxed eﬀects.
Environmental regulations (supply-side policies) intended to aﬀect production and con-
sumption patterns can encourage environmental innovation by making pollution more costly
(Jaﬀe et al., 2005; Lanjouw and Mody, 1996; Horbach, 2008; Klemetsen et al., 2013; Porter
and Van der Linde, 1995; Popp, 2003; Brunnermeier and Cohen, 2003). In the analysis of
environmental innovation we thus add ﬁrm level controls of direct (technology standards and
non-tradable emission quotas) and indirect environmental regulations (taxes and tradable
emission quotas).
In Norway, any emission that harms or may harm the environment is, as a general
rule prohibited. If a ﬁrm wishes to emit polluting substances it has to apply for a permit
from the Norwegian Environment Agency (NEA). The NEA regulates and monitors the
environmental performance of polluting operations involving more than 200 pollutants to
air and water. The regulations consist of both non-tradable emission quotas and technology
standards. When a ﬁrm is granted a permit, the NEA assigns each ﬁrm to a risk class. The
assignment to a risk class is based on the strength of the recipient of the emission (e.g. the
vulnerability of a river, its wind and stream conditions, popularity of a recreation area, etc.)
and the emission level. The risk classes vary from 1 (the highest) to 4 (the lowest), where
risk class 1 comprises ﬁrms considered to be potentially highly environmentally harmful. A
higher risk class is associated with higher regulatory costs for the ﬁrm in several ways. They
are subject to more frequent and more costly inspections, and warnings of higher ﬁnes. This
may provide an incentive for innovation. However, it may also be the case that unobserved
19
ﬁrm heterogeneity is correlated with risk class without being caused by it. An example is
heterogeneity with regard to emissions, since ﬁrms that emit regulated substances may be
more likely to develop new technology or products based on them than ﬁrms that do not.
Environmental taxes are usually levied on energy goods. Ideally, we would like to inves-
tigate the eﬀect of such taxes on patenting. However, in the data we cannot separate the
energy pre-tax prices from the emission taxes. In any case, the ﬁrm adjusts to the total
energy prices, including taxes. Energy prices of gas, petroleum and electricity are calculated
as the ﬁrm's use in NOK relative to the ﬁrm's use in kWh.19 The relative energy price is
calculated as the price of dirty energy (weighted gas and petroleum prices) relative to the
prices of clean energy (electricity). Electricity is clean energy as hydro power is the main
source of electricity production in Norway. High relative input prices can provide incentives
to innovate in factor reducing technologies (Hicks's induced innovation theory). Norway is
part of the EU Emission Trading Scheme (ETS), which regulates carbon emissions in the
EU and EFTA area. The ETS was introduced in 2005, and extended (phase 2) in 2008. We
include a dummy which is equal to 1 if the ﬁrm receives tradable emission quotas from the
ETS in a given year.
19Electricity prices are ﬁrm-speciﬁc in the energy-intensive part of the manufacturing industries, because prices are
based on long-term contracts. Other ﬁrms purchase electricity at market prices.
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Figure 3: The share of ﬁrms in each industry which during 1993-2011 have at least one patent
application, environmental patent application, granted patent or granted environmental
patent (upper panel), and which at least once have received R&D tax credits or direct R&D
subsidies from the Research Council (RCN) or Innovation Norway (IN) (lower panel).
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Table 4: Sample summary statistics, 1995-2011
&&&All ﬁrms&&&& Patenting ﬁrms&
Variable Mean Median Mean Median
Patent applications .006 0 .401 0
Granted patents .003 0 .186 0
Environmental patent applications .003 0 .185 0
Granted environmental patents .001 0 .093 0
Taxcredits (1000 NOK)1 6.93 0 129.4 0
Direct subsidies RCN (1000 NOK)2 6.35 0 237.7 0
Direct subsidies IN (1000 NOK)3 2.82 0 55.4 0
Tax credits (share)1 .015 0 .221 0
Direct subsidies RCN (share)2 .004 0 .110 0
Direct subsidies IN (share)3 .002 0 .027 0
Share of high-skilled employees .057 0 .155 .023
Number of employees 15 4 122 15
Proﬁt margin4 -.360 .041 -2.51 .046
Capital intensity5 298.3 38.8 820.6 77.8
Relative energy prices .97 .80 1.04 .82
EU ETS dummy .0002 0 .002 0
Dummy for risk class=1 .0004 0 .009 0
Dummy for risk class=2 .0009 0 .017 0
Dummy for risk class=3 .0029 0 .028 0
Dummy for risk class=4 .0012 0 .013 0
Number of ﬁrm-year observations 1,276,265 18,469
Number of ﬁrms 179,410 1,715
1Tax credits were present in the years 2002 and onwards
2Direct subsidies from the Research Council were present in the entire period
3Direct subsidies from Innovation Norway were present from 2000 and onwards
4Operating proﬁts relative to operating income
5Tangible ﬁxed assets excluding buildings and land (in 1000 NOK per employee)
2.4 Sample summary statistics
Our initial sample consists of 366,265 incorporated Norwegian ﬁrms over the time period
1993-2011. However, as we study the eﬀects of innovation policies in years t-1 and t-2 on
patenting in year t, innovation policies in the years 1993-1994 are automatically missing
and dropped. Moreover, we drop observations with missing values. Our ﬁnal unbalanced
panel data set consists of 1,276,265 (ﬁrm-year) observations and 179,410 ﬁrms. Finally,
in the ﬁxed eﬀects models, ﬁrms which never patent are automatically dropped from the
analysis. The estimation sample in the main model (Table 6, column II) thus consists of
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Table 5: Share of ﬁrm-years across industries, 1995-2011
Industry Percent
Primary 1.56
Mining 0.37
Oil and gas extraction 0.12
Manufacturing of textiles and food 3.79
Manufacturing of wood, pulp and paper 1.05
Manufacturing of chem., pharmac., rubber and plastic 0.56
Manufacturing of metals and minerals 2.08
Manufacturing of machinery and electronics 3.72
Power production and recycling 0.51
Construction 12.51
Retail trade 31.58
Transport 5.34
Services 36.83
Total 100
22,989 (ﬁrm-year) observations and 1,974 ﬁrms. Table 4 provides summary statistics for
the main variables. In addition, we include year ﬁxed eﬀects to control for common trends,
and industry dummy variables to capture industry-speciﬁc eﬀects. The thirteen industries
are aggregated as shown in Table 5 and are based on the oﬃcial industry classiﬁcation SIC
2007.
3 Empirical model and results
As already stated, our main research question is whether the two main types of innovation
policies  R&D tax credits and direct R&D subsidies  spur innovations in the form of
patenting. In line with the discussion in Section 2.2, we examine this question using dummy
variables indicating whether the ﬁrm receives subsidies from the various types of innovation
policies. We then investigate whether there is a connection between the innovation policies
and patenting.
In our empirical model, the dependent variable, Pit, is a count variable denoting the
number of patent applications of ﬁrm i in year t.. We assume that Pit, given a vector of
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explanatory variables, xit, and the ﬁrm-speciﬁc (random or ﬁxed) eﬀect, νi, has a Poisson
distribution with mean
E(Pit|xit, νi) ≡ λit = exp(x′itβ + νi). (1)
The Poisson-family of distributions has two main beneﬁts. First, provided the conditional
mean λit (the expected number of patent applications) is correctly speciﬁed, it yields a
consistent quasi-maximum likelihood estimator of β even if the assumption of a Poisson-
distribution does not hold (see Gourieroux and Monfort, 1995, Ch. 8.4). Second, it yields
a consistent estimator of β also when νi is a ﬁxed eﬀect (and possibly correlated with xit).
The latter does not hold for other common count models, such as e.g. the Negative Binomial
model.
Let us now deﬁne TCit = I (max {TaxCrediti,t−1,TaxCredit i,t−2} > 0) as the dummy
variable which is 1 if the ﬁrm received tax credits in year t-1 or t-2.20 Similarly, we deﬁne
DSit = I (max {DirSubi,t−1,DirSubi,t−2} > 0) as the dummy variable which is 1 if the ﬁrm
received direct subsidies from the Research Council or Innovation Norway in year t-1 or t-2.
We assume that the log of the expected number of patent applications, λit (see equation 1)
is given by the following equation:
ln(λit) = pi · TCit + γ ·DSit + X′itb + νi (2)
where Xit is a column vector containing the control variables described in Section 2.3,
including dummies for year (1993-2011) and industries (see Table 5 for a list). The two
explanatory variables of main interest are the innovation policies which enter equation (2)
with lagged values to eliminate the potential problem of reversed causality, i.e., that patent-
ing may aﬀect the innovation policy, rather than the other way around. We include the two
previous years since pinpointing the eﬀect from the policy is challenging, and since many
20I (A) is the indicator variable which is 1 if the statement A is true and zero if not.
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ﬁrms receive subsidies over several years. To avoid reverse causality with regard to the
control variables, the vector Xit also contains lagged (t-1) values, except for the industry
and year dummy variables, which refer to year t.
We acknowledge that the random eﬀects (RE) model does not solve the simultaneity
issues. Most importantly, ﬁrms that receive subsidies from any of the two types of policies,
are more likely to be innovative regardsless of whether they obtain subsidies or not. The
RE model is thus not appropriate for identifying causal eﬀects of the policies, and these
results are mainly useful for providing descriptive statistics. On the other hand, the ﬁxed
eﬀects (FE) speciﬁcation captures correlation between unobserved ﬁrm speciﬁc eﬀects and
observed right-hand side variables. This comes at the cost of throwing out from the analysis
ﬁrms that never patent, as time-invariant variables are automatically dropped in a ﬁxed
eﬀects speciﬁcation. As a result, the FE model is appropriate for investigating the intensity
of innovation rather than the propensity to innovate.21
The parameters of main interest in equation (2) are pi, which reﬂects the eﬀects from the
tax credits, and γ, which reﬂects the eﬀects from direct subsidies from the Research Council
or Innovation Norway. We can interpret pi and γ as the expected increases in the number of
patent applications resulting from receiving subsidies from the policy in question, relative
to the expected number of patent applications without the subsidy. From equation (10) in
Cameron and Trivedi (2014) it follows that for a subsidized ﬁrm the marginal eﬀect, MEit,
of receiving tax credits or direct subsidies in year t− 1 or t− 2 on the expected number of
patents, λit, are
METCit = γE (Pit|TCit = 0, DSit,Xit, νi)
MEDSit = piE (Pit|TCit, DSit = 0,Xit, νi) (3)
21Mohnen and Röller (2005) ﬁnd that the phase of the innovation process, i.e. the probability of becoming an
innovator and the intensity of innovation, are subject to diﬀerent constraints. However, as they point out, their
results are based on cross-sectional evidence. Hence, they are not able to solve potential endogeneity issues. We
choose to use a ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁcation where the endogeneity issues are signiﬁcantly reduced, even if this means
that we disregard ﬁrms that never patent.
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By summing up the marginal eﬀects, METCit , for the subsidized ﬁrms over all ﬁrm-years
where TCit = 1, we get an estimate of the total number of patents that are triggered by tax
credits, and similarly for MEDSit over ﬁrm-years with DSit = 1 for direct subsidies.
3.1 Results
The estimation results22 of the basic version of our econometric model in equation (2)
including all patent applications and granted patents are presented in Tables 6-7. The
estimated eﬀects on environmental patent applications and granted patents are displayed
in Tables 8 and 9. In these estimations we add controls (included in Xit in equation (2))
for direct and indirect environmental regulations, described in Section 2.3. Finally, we do
a robustness check with regard to the eﬀects of the innovation policies on the patenting of
SMEs and large ﬁrms respectively (see Tables 10-11).
3.1.1 All technologies
Table 6 contains the results of the eﬀects of innovation policies on the number of patent
applications, whereas Table 7 displays the eﬀects on the number of granted patents. RE
and FE correspond, respectively, to the random and ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁcation of νi (the
ﬁrm-eﬀect). The estimated coeﬃcients of the variables involving the innovation policies are
displayed in the two ﬁrst rows of both tables.
From the results in Table 6, it appears that both tax credits and direct subsidies have
positive and signiﬁcant eﬀects on innovation. The estimated relative eﬀect of tax credits (pi)
on the expected number of patent applications is 0.63 in the RE model (signiﬁcant at the 1
percent level) and 0.23 in the FE model (signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level). This means that
the estimated relative increase in expected number of patent applications stemming from
obtaining tax credits compared to not obtaining the subsidy is 0.23 (in the FE model). The
estimated relative eﬀect of direct subsidies (γ) on the expected number of patent applications
22The results are obtained using the xtpoisson command in STATA.
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Table 6: Results: Eﬀect of innovation policies on patent applications
Poisson Count model RE FE
Explanatory variables: Coef. Est. S.E. Est. S.E.
Tax credits pi .630*** .010 .165** .072
Direct subsidies γ .679*** .042 .230** .099
Share of high-skilled employees 1.581*** .002 .029 .162
Firm size (1000 employees) .040** .019 .026 .021
Proﬁt margin .0001 .0001 .0002 .0003
Capital intensity .002*** .0005 .001*** .0004
Sum of ME (Tax credits) 367** 144
Sum of ME (Direct subsidies) 687** 261
Number of ﬁrm-year observations 1,276,265 18,469
Number of ﬁrms 179,410 1,715
Full set of industry and year dummies are included but not reported.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors.
is 0.68 (signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level) in the RE model and 0.17 in the FE model
(signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level). Tax credits thus appear to have just slightly smaller
eﬀects than direct subsidies. We see that in the FE model, the hypothesis that pi = γ
cannot be rejected. Hence, we do not ﬁnd any support for signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the
eﬀects of the two diﬀerent types of innovation policies on the number of patent applications.
The estimates based on the RE speciﬁcation are much larger than those of the FE model.
This indicates that there are in fact serious selection issues present that invalidate the RE
speciﬁcation assumptions. Not surprising, ﬁrms that apply for R&D subsidies are likely to
be more innovative than ﬁrms which do not apply. The RE speciﬁcation is thus primarily
useful for providing a descriptive representation of the policies. Henceforth we only give
detailed descriptions of the FE results, and unless stated otherwise, all results refer to the
FE model.
With regard to the control variables, the estimated coeﬃcients of employee skill, ﬁrm
size and capital intensity are positive and signiﬁcant in the RE model. However, in the FE
model, only capital intensity is signiﬁcant.
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Table 7: Results: Eﬀect of innovation policies on granted patents
Poisson Count model RE FE
Explanatory variables: Coef. Est. S.E. Est. S.E.
Tax credits pi .836*** .008 .193* .101
Direct subsidies γ .972*** .006 .195** .098
Share of high-skilled employees 1.902*** .002 .062 .272
Firm size (1000 employees) .054** .020 .023 .020
Proﬁt margin .0001 .0002 .0001 .0003
Capital intensity .0002 .0002 .0002 .0002
Sum of ME (Tax credits) 183* 86
Sum of ME (Direct subsidies) 293** 131
Number of ﬁrm-year observations 1,276,265 10,377
Number of ﬁrms 179,410 962
Full set of industry and year dummies are included but not reported.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors.
We replicate the results of Table 6 in Table 7, with granted patents instead of ﬁled
patent applications. This allows us (at least partly) to take into account the quality of the
innovation. For this analysis, we excluded the last observation year (2011) to ensure that
at least 90 percent of the applications of the last included year (2010) were processed at the
date of our patent data extraction (May 2014). This is due to the timeliness issues described
in Section 2.1.
Our ﬁndings from the analysis of the eﬀects on patent applications are mostly replicated
in Table 7. The estimated relative eﬀect of tax credits (pi) on the expected number of patents
is 0.19 (signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level). The estimated relative eﬀect of direct subsidies
(γ) on the expected number of patents is 0.20 (signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level). Similar
to Table 6, the eﬀect of direct subsidies is marginally greater than the eﬀect of tax credits.
However, we cannot reject that pi = γ, and thus we cannot say that the eﬀects of the two
diﬀerent types of innovation policies diﬀer. If the issue of direct subsidies picking winners
is imminent, we could perhaps expect a drop in the estimated eﬀect of direct subsidies on
granted patents. Our results do not indicate any such tendency.
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The estimates of the control variables are quite similar to those of Table 6, with the
exception of the estimate of the parameter attached to capital intensity, which is now in-
signiﬁcant.
By summing up the marginal eﬀects calculated as indicated in equation (3) tax credits
are estimated to have triggered 367 patent applications and 183 granted patents. Similarly,
direct subsidies are estimated to have triggered 687 patent applications and 293 granted
patents. Direct subsidies have thus triggered almost twice as many patents compared to
tax credits, even if the estimates of the relative eﬀects, the estimates of pi and γ, are almost
identical. On the other hand, ﬁrms receiving tax credits typically acquire around half of the
amount as ﬁrms receiving direct subsidies.23 Moreover, tax credits were introduced some
years later than direct subsidies.24 Taking these factors into account, tax credits can be
seen as more eﬃcient in generating patents than direct subsidies. However, as the number
of patents by itself does not provide an indication of their relative importance and impact,
we cannot exclude the possibility that direct subsidies trigger more valuable innovations.
3.1.2 Environmental technologies
Table 8 displays estimated eﬀects of innovation policies on environmental patent applica-
tions, whereas Table 9 displays eﬀects on granted environmental patents. The estimated
coeﬃcients of the innovation policy variables are displayed in the two ﬁrst rows of both
tables. From the FE results in Table 8, it appears that both tax credits and direct subsidies
have positive eﬀects on environmental patenting. The estimate of pi is only 0.16 and not
signiﬁcant at any conventional level. On the other hand, direct subsidies (γ) have highly
positive and signiﬁcant eﬀects on environmental innovation. The estimated relative eﬀect
23Comparing the number of patents triggered by the two types of policies with the administrative costs of the
policies, the diﬀerences in relative eﬃciency would be larger. However, one of the explanations for the low admin-
istrative costs of the tax credits is lower requirements of documentation. Hence, the possibility of tax motivated
adaptations are more likely to be present. It is possible that ﬁrms claim tax credits against spending that they would
not previously have classiﬁed as R&D (OECD, 2007). Norwegian studies ﬁnd tendencies of such adaptions (Fjærli,
2007; Olgyai et al., 2006). Administrative costs are thus not necessarily an advisable benchmark to measure eﬃciency.
More research on possible tax evasion and avoidance resulting from R&D policies is thus necessary.
24Tax credits were introduced in 2002, whereas the Research Council provided direct R&D subsidies in the entire
estimation period (1995-2011). Innovation Norway started providing direct innovation subsidies from around 2000.
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Table 8: Results: Eﬀect of innovation policies on environmental patent applications
Poisson Count model RE FE
Explanatory variables: Coef. Est. S.E. Est. S.E.
Tax credits pi .718*** .005 .156 .097
Direct subsidies γ .882*** .016 .248** .116
Share of high-skilled employees 1.888*** .002 .113 .190
Firm size (1000 employees) .074*** .010 .051** .021
Proﬁt margin .0001 .0002 .0002 .0004
Capital intensity .052*** .008 .001*** .0004
Relative energy prices (dirty/clean) .022 .024 .031 .049
Risk class = 1 3.172*** .120 .548** .263
Risk class = 2 1.567*** .256 .068 .356
Risk class = 3 1.541*** .055 .034 .841
Sum of ME (Tax credits) 158 89
Sum of ME (Direct subsidies) 389** 158
Number of ﬁrm-year observations 1,276,265 9,765
Number of ﬁrms 179,410 900
Full set of industry and year dummies are included but not reported.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors.
on the expected number of patents is 0.25 (signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level).
With regard to the control variables, the estimated coeﬃcients of ﬁrm size and capital
intensity are positive and signiﬁcant. Firm size was not signiﬁcant in Table 6. Hence, scale
eﬀects only seem to be present for ﬁrms which innovate in environmental technologies, and
not necessarily for ﬁrms that innovate in other types of technologies. A possible explana-
tion is that environmental innovation generate larger knowledge spillovers, as suggested by
Dechezleprêtre et al. (2013).
The estimated coeﬃcients of environmental regulations that ﬁrms may be exposed to
are displayed in the four last rows. The estimated coeﬃcient of relative energy prices is
positive but not signiﬁcant. Hence, based on these results, we cannot conﬁrm that an
increase in the ratio between prices on dirty and clean energy leads to increased incentives
for environmental innovation. The estimated coeﬃcients of the risk class dummies, reﬂecting
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Table 9: Results: Eﬀect of innovation policies on granted environmental patents
Poisson Count model RE FE
Explanatory variables: Coef. Est. S.E. Est. S.E.
Tax credits pi .875*** .070 .174 .118
Direct subsidies γ 1.142*** .006 .230* .135
Share of high-skilled employees 2.131*** .004 .412 .390
Firm size (1000 employees) .059** .030 .024 .018
Proﬁt margin .0001 .0002 .0001 .0003
Capital intensity .0002 .0002 .018 .013
Relative energy prices (dirty/clean) .024 .021 .046 .040
Risk class = 1 2.991*** .121 .567 .808
Risk class = 2 2.109*** .176 .418 .510
Risk class = 3 1.410*** .028 .041 .227
Sum of ME (Tax credits) 83 51
Sum of ME (Direct subsidies) 193* 100
Number of ﬁrm-year observations 1,276,265 5,716
Number of ﬁrms 179,410 519
Full set of industry and year dummies are included but not reported.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors.
direct regulations, are positive and decreasing with risk class, which may reﬂect that ﬁrms in
risk class 1 are more strictly regulated, but also that they are typically dirtier and perhaps
more likely to invent new environmental technologies notwithstanding the regulatory regime.
The reference category consists of the ﬁrms in risk class 4 and the ﬁrms that are not regulated
by the NEA. The estimated coeﬃcient of the highest risk class (1) is signiﬁcant at the 5
percent level, whereas the risk class 2 and 3 dummies do not enter signiﬁcantly. These
estimates should be viewed as control variables rather than causal eﬀects, as discussed in
Section 2.3.25
In order to take into account some patent quality aspects, we replicate the results of
Table 8 in Table 9, with granted environmental patents instead of environmental patent
applications. Our ﬁndings from the analysis of the eﬀects on patent applications are mostly
25See Klemetsen et al. (2013) for an analysis of the causal eﬀect of direct regulations on innovation of environmental
technologies.
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Table 10: Results: Eﬀect of innovation policies on patent applications: SMEs
Poisson Count model RE FE
Explanatory variables: Coef. Est. S.E. Est. S.E.
Tax credits pi .939*** .013 .195*** .076
Direct subsidies γ .732*** .021 .120* .069
Share of high-skilled employees 1.907*** .039 .101 .152
Firm size (1000 employees) 1.299 .177 .691*** .154
Proﬁt margin .0004 .0003 .0002 .0003
Capital intensity .001 .002 .001*** .0003
Sum of ME (Tax credits) 268*** 93
Sum of ME (Direct subsidies) 137* 71
Number of ﬁrm-year observations 1,261,748 15,976
Number of ﬁrms 177,959 1,516
Full set of industry and year dummies are included but not reported.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors.
conﬁrmed in Table 9. The estimated relative eﬀect on the expected number of patents
stemming from R&D tax credits is 0.17 (but not signiﬁcant at any conventional level).
The estimated relative eﬀect of direct subsidies on the expected number of patents is 0.23
(signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level).
Regarding the control variables, none of the estimates are now signiﬁcant. This is likely
due to the decrease in sample size (519 ﬁrms in Table 9 compared to 900 in Table 8).
We estimate the sum of marginal eﬀects as indicated in equation (3). The estimates of
the number of environmental patent applications and granted patents triggered by direct
subsidies are 389 and 193, respectively. Tax credits are estimated to have triggered 158
patent applications and 83 granted patents, but the estimates are not signiﬁcant at any
conventional level. This ﬁnding is likely to reﬂect that environmental innovation is more
exposed to externalities and that the design of the tax credit scheme does not take this into
account by being technology neutral.
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Table 11: Results: Eﬀect of innovation policies on patent applications: Large ﬁrms
Poisson Count model RE FE
Explanatory variables: Coef. Est. S.E. Est. S.E.
Tax credits pi .147* .092 .061 .118
Direct subsidies γ .552*** .092 .395** .202
Share of high-skilled employees .271 .254 .021 .174
Firm size (1000 employees) .034 .026 .035 .032
Proﬁt margin .028 .006 .012 .014
Capital intensity .002*** .0003 .009*** .0003
Sum of ME (Tax credits) 52 99
Sum of ME (Direct subsidies) 696*** 113
Number of ﬁrm-year observations 14,517 2,493
Number of ﬁrms 1,451 199
Full set of industry and year dummies are included but not reported.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors.
3.1.3 SMEs and large ﬁrms
Table 10 displays estimated eﬀects of innovation policies on patent applications in SMEs,
whereas Table 11 displays eﬀects on patent applications in large ﬁrms. Similar to in Table 1
small and medium sized ﬁrms are here deﬁned as having less than 250 employees, and large
ﬁrms as having 250 or more employees. From the results in Table 10, it appears tax credits
have positive and highly signiﬁcant eﬀects on patenting in SMEs. The estimated coeﬃcient
is 0.20 (signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level). Summing up the marginal eﬀects, tax credits are
estimated to have triggered 268 patent applications among SMEs. However, from Table 11
we see that tax credits are estimated to have triggered 52 patent applications among large
ﬁrms, but this estimate is far from signiﬁcant. The lack of eﬀect on large ﬁrms could mean
that the return of the policy investments to large ﬁrms are lower. However, as larger ﬁrms
are more innovative (see Section 2.2), it is more likely that the lack of eﬀect is due to the
fact that tax credits provide less incentives for large ﬁrms. First, as large ﬁrms receive a
smaller tax credit refund percentage (18 compared to 20 percent for SMEs). Second, as
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R&D spending increase with ﬁrm size, larger ﬁrms' R&D are likely to more often exceed
the tax credit limit, and thus not incentivized on the margin. As the most innovative ﬁrms
are likely to already invest substantially in R&D, the maximum limit is likely to prevent the
private returns from tax credits from ending up where they would have the largest eﬀect.
Direct subsidies, on the other hand, have positive and signiﬁcant eﬀects on patenting in both
groups of ﬁrms, although much larger eﬀects on patenting in large ﬁrms. The estimated
coeﬃcients are 0.40 for large ﬁrms (signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level) and 0.12 for small
ﬁrms (signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level). Summing up the marginal eﬀects, we estimate
the direct subsidies to have triggered 696 patent applications among large ﬁrms and 137
patent applications among SMEs.
4 Conclusions and policy implications
We ﬁnd that both R&D tax credits and direct R&D subsidies have signiﬁcant positive
eﬀects on patenting in general. Although direct subsidies have triggered more patents, tax
credits are more eﬃcient in the sense that they have triggered more patents relative to the
typical subsidy amount received. However, as these results do not take into account that
the value of patents diﬀer, we cannot exclude the possibility that direct subsidies trigger
more valuable patents than tax credits.
Innovation policies to support private R&D activities should ﬁrst and foremost reﬂect
the size of the external spillovers from the research. Direct subsidies from the Research
Council and Innovation Norway are thus targeted speciﬁcally towards projects with low
private return and high social return, such as e.g. the development of environmental tech-
nologies. Our results indicate that tax credits do not stimulate environmental technologies
signiﬁcantly, whereas we identify large and signiﬁcant eﬀects from direct subsidies on envi-
ronmental innovation. This ﬁnding is likely to reﬂect that environmental innovation is more
exposed to market failures and that the design of the tax credit scheme does not take this
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into account by being technology neutral. First, environmental innovation is exposed to the
environmental externality. Second, the literature suggests that environmental innovation
generates larger knowledge externalities. Third, the development of environmental tech-
nologies is an example of an innovation sector that often requires more risk taking, larger
initial investments and a longer time horizon. Neither the market nor technology-neutral
innovation policies remove the barriers for perfect competition between environmental and
non-environmental innovation. Targeting R&D subsidies speciﬁcally towards prioritized
technology areas that generate larger externalities is thus likely necessary in order to foster
major innovation leaps and new technologies that are not already close to the market.
The Norwegian tax credits favor SMEs as these statistically are exposed to more ﬁnan-
cial constraints. Furthermore, due to a budget constraint, ﬁrms with relatively low R&D
expenditures are more incentivized. Our results indicate that both tax credits and direct
subsidies have positive and signiﬁcant eﬀects on patenting in SMEs. However, whereas the
eﬀects of direct subsidies on patenting in large ﬁrms are high and signiﬁcant, there are no
signiﬁcant eﬀects of tax credits on patenting in large ﬁrms. This ﬁnding is likely to reﬂect
that tax credits provide less incentives for larger ﬁrms. This can both be as large ﬁrms
receive a slightly smaller percentage deduction from the taxes (18 rather than 20), but also
as ambitious R&D projects that exceed the tax credit limit are not incentivized on the
margin. An end of the current positive discrimination of SMEs is thus likely to steer tax
credits to where they would have the largest eﬀects. However, loans or grants early in the
innovation process are more likely to facilitate access to capital than a tax credit oﬀered
in retrospect. Moreover, loans oﬀer a better solution than grants as we cannot identify the
ﬁrms which truly have low access to private venture capital.26
26The beneﬁt of using loans instead of grants in order to reduce ﬁnancial constraints is that loans are less likely to
be misused as the ﬁrm will have to pay interest.
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